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Evolution of Threats in the Global Risk Network
Xiang Niu1,2+ · Alaa Moussawi1,3 · Gyorgy
Korniss1,3 · Boleslaw K. Szymanski1,2+∗
Abstract With a steadily growing population and rapid advancements in technology,
the global economy is increasing in size and complexity. This growth exacerbates
global vulnerabilities and may lead to unforeseen consequences such as global pan-
demics fueled by air travel, cyberspace attacks, and cascading failures caused by the
weakest link in a supply chain. Hence, a quantitative understanding of the mecha-
nisms driving global network vulnerabilities is urgently needed. Developing methods
for efficiently monitoring evolution of the global economy is essential to such un-
derstanding. Each year the World Economic Forum publishes an authoritative report
on the state of the global economy and identifies risks that are likely to be active,
impactful or contagious. Using a Cascading Alternating Renewal Process approach
to model the dynamics of the global risk network, we are able to answer critical
questions regarding the evolution of this network. To fully trace the evolution of the
network we analyze the asymptotic state of risks (risk levels which would be reached
in the long term if the risks were left unabated) given a snapshot in time; this eluci-
dates the various challenges faced by the world community at each point in time. We
also investigate the influence exerted by each risk on others. Results presented here
are obtained through either quantitative analysis or computational simulations.
Keywords Global Risk Network · Cascading Failures · Cascades Alternating
Renewal Processes · Network Evolution ·Mean-field Steady State
Introduction
Recently, cascading failures have been extensively studied, with most studies on in-
frastructure systems [1,2], financial institutions [3,4,5], and the Internet [6,7]. In [1],
the authors analyze cascading failures in power grid networks. In real and synthetic
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spatial systems, they study properties of failures and strategies to reduce the corre-
sponding damages. In either single-node or multi-nodes cases, the damage caused by
attacks is weakly correlated with network properties, such as node degree or initial
state load. They also test different mitigation strategies and various combinations of
node failures. Knowing in advance a set of failing nodes and damage incurred by
every single-node failure, they are able to predict the damage caused by sets of multi-
node failures. That is because, in the multi-node failure, the node with the highest
damage dominates the entire multi-node cascading failure. Authors in [2] also focus
on blackout cascading failure mechanisms. Studying the real blackouts from a few
countries, they find that frequencies of blackouts exhibit a power-law distribution
in agreement with the scale-free property of complex networks. The authors’ power
system model suggests that the real power system gradually reaches a critical point.
In the area of financial institutions, authors in [3] discuss the failures of banking
ecosystems. Inspired by models from food webs and disease networks, the authors
apply an analogous model in financial networks to reduce risks. In [4], the authors
study the contagion in the financial market. They mainly focus on the robustness of
asset market liquidity. With a novel model based on the Poisson random graph in the
banking system, they find that high average degree of nodes increases both the prob-
ability of transmission and the speed of contagion. Using the feedback-centrality, the
authors in [5] propose a DebtRank to find the critical nodes that play the most impor-
tant role in the systemic failure of financial networks. They studied a real dataset from
Fed emergency loans program and detected 22 institutions that were critical to 2008-
2010 crises. They also find that some small institutions can be important because of
their high centralities in the network. Unlike here, the authors do not even attempt to
match the model with historical data. In [8,9,10,11], the authors observe historical
correlations between stock prices and build stock dependency networks. They also
consider events that may affect the stock market such as ”tsunami in Japan”. In their
node failure analysis, they mainly focus on the failure of one industry and test the
system tolerance of such failure. In summary, the research in the above papers targets
the cascade failures in the global financial market.
Some other analyses are related to the cascade failure of the Internet. In [6], the
authors analyze the fault-tolerance of Internet service. They establish that Internet
failures are mainly caused by operator errors and suggest the use of extensive online
testing to reduce the failure rates. In [7], the authors find that the latent errors are
likely to accumulate within the Internet services and cause chain reaction cascades.
In [12], the authors analyze spontaneous recovery from cascading failures of econ-
omy. In their model, a node can fail independently or by external causes. All nodes
have the same internal failure probability so the authors can solve the model using
mean-field equation.
Only a few of studies discussed above focus on the cascades of global risks [13,
14]. Yet, the global risks impact highly global economy and lives of countless people.
Hence, there is an urgent need to study and understand global risk network. Here, we
model such network using a Cascading Alternating Renewal Processes (CARP) [13,
14,15]. In the model, a system alternates between active and passive states, denoted
by 1 and 0 respectively. An active risk represents a failed node, while a passive risk
corresponds to a fully operational node. State transitions are instantaneous. They are
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triggered by non-homogeneousPoisson processes [13]. Given the complexity of real-
world network interactions and node specific dynamics, the processes causing state
transitions may be observable, or latent. The latent processes are not directly ob-
servable, only their combined effect, a state transition, is. In the global risk model,
the latent processes are categorized as endogenous (caused internally at the node) or
exogenous (caused by neighboring active risk node) Poisson processes. Their param-
eters are recovered by maximum likelihood estimation from the records of historical
events.
The risks listed in the WEF Global Risk Reports [16,17,18,19,20] constantly
change; new risks arise and are added to the network, while existing active risks
either continue to be a threat and remain in the network, or, thanks to the response of
threatened governments and industry, decline in importance and are removed. This
evolution causes continuous changes in the global risks and their probabilities, and
leads to an annual revision of the list of risks present in the network. However, if left
unabated, the global risk network would approach the steady state, in which some
risk will be active much more frequently making their threats much more pronounced
than in the initial state. These considerations motivate us not to compare the states
of the global risk network at fixed points in time. Instead, we compare the steady
states to which these initial states would evolve if no changes to the system had been
introduced. Looking at the steady states accentuates the different challenges that the
well-being and stability of the global risks network has faced at each reported point
in the time.
The CARP model has been successfully applied to analyze cascading failures of
global risks in [13] by taking into account the interconnectivity and interdependence
among risks. This model is also used here to analyze the evolution of the global risk
network. Furthermore, in [14], the authors investigate the asymptotic normality of
the MLE procedure used to find the most likely model parameters in CARP. They
demonstrate that this property is preserved in the presence of latent processes caus-
ing state transitions. We use this property here to bind the error of model parameter
recovery in the global risk network.
In the following sections of the paper we analyze evolution of risks over the years
2013-2017. Some of these results were presented in [21] but they were limited to two
points in time, year 2013 and year 2017. Hence, the number of the results and points
of evolution presented here more than doubled. Consequently, all the analyses and
evaluations were expanded accordingly. In particular, we first present the annual evo-
lution of the risk network itself from 2013 to 2017. We also show how the definitions
of risks themselves change and how we deal with these changes. Finally, we present
and discuss how steady states of risks evolve annually.
Models
CARP
The CARP model for the global risk network contains two primary types of Poisson
processes: two latent passive risk activation processes and a directly observable active
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risk continuation process. Here, we further subdivide the passive risk activation type
into internal activation and external activation. We assume that the active risk contin-
uation process is always triggered internally. The corresponding Poisson processes
are defined as follows [13].
– Passive risk with internal activation: a passive risk i is activated internally with
intensity λ inti . The Poisson probability of transition over one time unit is p
int
i =
1− e−λ
int
i .
– Passive risk with external activation: a passive risk i is activated externally by the
neighboring active risk j with intensity λ extji . The corresponding Poisson proba-
bility is pextji = 1− e
−λ extji .
– Active risk continuation: an active risk i continues its activity for the next time
unit internally with intensity λ coni . The correspondingPoisson probability is p
con
i =
1− e−λ
con
i = 1− preci , where p
rec
i denotes probability of recovery in a time unit
from an active risk i.
Using the likelihood li for each risk i provided by experts in the WEF Global Risk
Reports [16,17,18,19,20], we obtain a normalized likelihood Li, which indicates how
likely a risk i is to be active by logarithmic transformation λ inti = −α ln(1− Li),
λ extji =−β ln(1−Li), λ
con
i =−γ ln(1−Li) [13] getting:
pinti = 1− (1−Li)
α
pextji = 1− (1−Li)
β
pconi = 1− (1−Li)
γ . (1)
The advantage of Eq. 1 is that the probabilities of the three Poisson processes are
defined only by a normalized likelihood Li and model parameters α,β ,γ . These pa-
rameters are needed because while humans can often adequately estimate relative
probabilities by crowd sourcing, they usually are less precise in predicting absolute
probabilities. By providing a mapping from likelihood to probabilities based on the
most likely values of the model parameters obtained through MLE procedure [22]
they model over historical data, we account for expert biases that may render the ab-
solute probabilities inaccurate, while extracting relevant information from the relative
estimations of the likelihoods.
After combining the probabilities of all possible transitions of the Poisson pro-
cesses in the risk network, we obtain the state transition probabilities [13] as
Pi(t)
0→1 = 1− (1− pinti ) ∏
j∈Ni
(1− pextji )
Pi(t)
1→0 = preci . (2)
where Pi(t)
s1→s2 represents the probability of a state transition from state s1 to state
s2 for risk i at time t, while Ni represents the set of neighbors of risk i that were active
at time t− 1.
The specific state transition probability of all risks over one time unit is
−−→
S(t) =
∏Ri=1 Pi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1), where we sum over all R risks. The likelihood of the sequence
of state transition of all risks is L(
−−→
S(1),
−−→
S(2), ...,
−−→
S(T )) = ∏T−1t=1 ∏
R
i=1 Pi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1),
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where T represents the number of time steps during the entire observed or predicted
evolution [13]. The corresponding log-likelihood is
lnL(
−−→
S(1),
−−→
S(2), ...,
−−→
S(T )) =
T−1
∑
t=1
R
∑
i=1
lnPi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1). (3)
We compute the most likely values of model parameters α,β , and γ by maxi-
mizing the log-likelihood (Eq. 3) of the observed state transitions over the historical
data [23,22]. With these most likely values, we simulate the system evolution to iden-
tify the mean-field steady state evolution of the global risk network at any particular
point in time. Given the state of the global risk network at time t we ask to what state
the network will evolve as t → ∞ if it is not further influenced by external actors.
We simulate the system evolution as t → ∞ training on historical data till time t, and
relying only on learned model dynamics past time t. We approximate the asymptotic
state at a finite time at which activity frequencies for all risks stabilize.
Related Works
The CARP model for global risk network was first proposed and analyzed in detail
in [13]. Through the study of 2013 network, the authors calculate the contagion po-
tentials of risks, risk persistence and risk failure cascade survival probability caused
by a single risk failure. The risk persistence is calculated as the fraction of time steps
during which a risk is active. The contagion potential is not positively correlated with
internal activation probability, but is mainly defined by external activation and re-
covery probabilities. Ranked by their contagion potentials, the top three risks are:
”Severe income disparity”, ”Chronic fiscal imbalances”, and ”Rising greenhouse gas
emissions”. The results show that about 80% of the time, the number of active risks is
between 8 and 19. By setting internal activation probabilities of risks to zero, the au-
thors found cascade survival probability initiated by a single risk decreases exponen-
tially with time. To validate the choice of the model, the authors compared it with 60
alternative models, including disconnected model (β = 0, so only internal activation
is acting), expert data based model (α = 1,β = 0, internal activation is equal to like-
lihood Li), uniform model (likelihood Li is ignored), weighted network model (edges
are assigned different weights depending on the number of experts listing them) and
combinations of them. The CARP model outperforms all other models with at least
95% statistical confidence interval because it takes into account the interconnectivity
and interdependence among risks.
The precision of predictability is likely to depend on the quality and amount of
historical ground truth data. Thus, in [14], the authors proposed an artificial model
of fire propagation among houses to establish the limits of model predictability. The
authors use simulations of CARP model to generate data with arbitrary lengths (from
100 to 6400 time steps) and arbitrary number of variants of model execution. The
authors use these variants as alternative historical ground truth data. Theymeasure the
prediction precision between variants at different length of alternative historical data,
and study how the prediction precision changes over time. The authors conclude that
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Table 1 Indices and descriptions of global risks from the year 2013 to 2017. To compare related risks in
different years, we give them same numerical code but different alphabetical indices here. In the World
Economic Forum (WEF) Global Risk Reports, experts define risks in 5 categories: economic (blue), envi-
ronmental (green), geopolitical (orange), societal (red) and technological (purple).
Risk
index Risk description
2013
index
2014
index
2015
index
2016
index
2017
index
01 Fiscal crises in key economies 01 01 06 05 05
High structural unemployment
02 or underemployment 02 04 07 06 06
Failure of a major financial mechanism
03 or institution 05 02 04 03 03
04 Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure 06 06 05 04 04
05a Severe energy price shock - 05 03 08 08
05b Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices 03 - - - -
06a Asset bubble in a major economy - - 01 01 01
06b Liquidity crises 07 03 - - -
07a Deflation in a major economy - - 02 02 02
07b Unmanageable inflation - - 08 09 09
07c Unmanageable inflation or deflation 10 - - - -
Decline of importance of the US dollar
07d as a major currency - 07 - - -
08 Severe income disparity 08 25 - - -
09 Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation 09 - - - -
10 Hard landing of an emerging economy 04 - - - -
11 Extreme weather events 16 08 09 10 10
Failure of climate-change mitigation
12 and adaptation 12 13 10 11 11
13 Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse 18 11 11 12 12
14a Major natural catastrophes - 09 12 13 13
14b Unprecedented geophysical destruction 19 - - - -
14c Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms 20 - - - -
15a Man-made environmental catastrophes - 10 13 14 14
15b Irremediable pollution 13 - - - -
15c Land and waterway use mismanagement 14 - - - -
15d Rising greenhouse gas emissions 17 - - - -
16 Antibiotic-resistant bacteria 11 26 - - -
17 State collapse or crisis 21 15 17 18 19
18 Weapons of mass destruction 22 19 18 19 20
19 Interstate conflict with regional consequences 24 20 15 16 17
20 Large-scale terrorist attacks 28 18 16 17 18
21a Illicit trade 30 - - 07 07
21b Entrenched organized crime 23 - - - -
Major escalation in organized crime
21c and illicit trade - 17 - - -
22a Failure of national governance - - 14 15 15
22b Pervasive entrenched corruption 27 16 - - -
23 Failure of global governance 25 14 - - 16
24 Unilateral resource nationalization 29 21 - - -
25 Militarization of space 26 - - - -
26 Failure of urban planning 15 27 19 20 21
27 Food crises 32 22 20 21 22
28 Water crises 40 12 24 25 26
29a Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases - - 23 24 25
29b Rising rates of chronic disease 35 24 - - -
29c Vulnerability to pandemics 39 23 - - -
30 Large-scale involuntary migration 37 - 21 22 23
31 Profound political and social instability - 28 22 23 24
32 Backlash against globalization 31 - - - -
33 Ineffective illicit drug policies 33 - - - -
34 Mismanagement of population aging 34 - - - -
35 Rising religious fanaticism 36 - - - -
36 Unsustainable population growth 38 - - - -
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure
37 and networks 41 29 25 27 28
38 Large-scale cyberattacks 42 30 26 28 29
39 Massive incident of data fraud/theft 45 31 27 29 30
40a Adverse consequences of technological advances - - 28 26 27
40b Massive digital misinformation 44 - - - -
40c Proliferation of orbital debris 47 - - - -
Unforeseen consequences of climate change
40d mitigation 48 - - - -
40e Unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology 49 - - - -
Unforeseen consequences of new life science
40f technologies 50 - - - -
41 Failure of intellectual property regime 43 - - - -
42 Mineral resource supply vulnerability 46 - - - -
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the average relative error of parameter recovery decays according to the power law
of the size of historical data and ultimately tends to zero when the length of historical
data tends to infinity. These results demonstrate that the asymptotic normality ofMLE
holds also in the presence of latent Poisson processes.
There are some similarities between the CARP model [15] and epidemic models,
such as SIS [24], if we consider risks as a population undergoing infection with the
activation pathogen. Yet deeper comparison reveals that the CARP model is more
complex by including latent exogenous (becoming sick by infection) and directly
observable endogenous (becoming sick without or not through contact with infected
nodes) activation. Thus, finding model parameters matching historical data is more
complex in CARP model than in epidemic model. Another significant difference is
the evolution of transition probabilities and risk population, as new threats arise, old
ones die, and some existing risks change their probability to activate as a result of
the increasing resilience developed by threatened governments, organizations, and
people.
Risk Network Evolution
In the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Risk Reports [16,17,18,19,20], ex-
perts define risks in five categories: economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal
and technological. The list of risks is shown in Table 1. We use five different colors
to differentiate between risk categories and to aid the understanding of the WEF net-
work, because each year the risks are categorized slightly differently. To track related
risks, we give them identical numerical codes. The categories of risks vary over the
years as well. For example, risk 21a “Illicit trade” is in the geopolitical category in
2013 and 2014 when experts felt illicit activity and crime were probable risks. In
2016 and 2017 this risk is categorized as economic, considering that such trade im-
pacts more the global economy than geopolitical factors. In the 2013 risk network,
the risks are uniformly distributed over the five categories. From 2014 to 2017, the
economic risks category is the largest and contains around eight risks; the environ-
mental, geopolitical and societal categories contain approximately six risks, and the
technological category is the smallest with mostly four risks.
Fig. 1 and 2 show how the global risk network and it’s properties have changed
over time. In Fig. 1, each node represents different risk from Table 1. Each undirected
unweighted link of two endpoints represents that the two risks are related in opinion
of some WEF experts. For the WEF report, each of the experts was asked to answer
the question: ”Global risks are not isolated and it is important to assess their intercon-
nections. In your view, which are the most strongly connected global risks? Please
select three to six pairs of global risks.” Then the interconnection wi j between risks i
and j is calculated as:
wi j =
√
∑Nn=1 pairi j,n
pairmax
pairmax =max
i j
(
N
∑
n=1
pairi j,n)
(4)
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39
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29a27
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01
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18
07b
07c
06a
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Fig. 1 The evolution of risk networks over five years from 2013 to 2017. Although the number of risks
vary over the years, the five groups of risk remain unchanged. We use the same layout for each year
network and fix the relative positions of risks with the same index over the years. The risks are in five
color groups and five location groups. A color group is the category of a risk in a certain year labeled by
experts, while locations of the groups are labeled by us and remain unchanged over the years. The groups
are as follows: economic, with mostly blue nodes placed leftmost of the network and including risks 01-10;
environmental, with mostly green nodes placed the second to the left and at the bottom part of the figure
with risk 11-16; geopolitical, with mostly orange nodes placed the middle and at the top of the figure with
risk 17-25; societal, with mostly red nodes placed the second to the right and at the bottom of the figure
with risk 26-36; technological, with purple nodes placed at the rightmost of the figure with risk 37-42.
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Fig. 2 The evolving risk network properties over five years from 2013 to 2017. The 2013 network is
the largest and also contains most edges. However, it is not the one with the highest density, since 2015
and 2017 networks are much smaller and with a large number of edges. Generally, 2013, 2015 and 2017
networks have relatively high average degrees, degree assortativity coefficients, average clustering coeffi-
cients, and max clique sizes and relatively low diameters and average shortest path lengths.
where pairi j,n is 1 if the risks i and j are interconnected from the perspective of
expert n, otherwise it is 0 [20]. In paper [13], the authors report on testing whether
the model with weighted edges outperforms the one used here which has unweighted
edges and current model was statistically significantly better than the weighted edge
alternative. By definition, these edges represent risk relationships, thus they act as
transmission channels for risk propagation through the external activation process.
The 2013 risk network is the largest, with the greatest average degree. Despite this,
due to the smaller size of the 2017 network, its risks have greater interconnectivity, a
larger mean clustering coefficient, and a smaller diameter. Most subfigures in Fig. 2
show that the 2013, 2015, and 2017 networks are denser than the 2014 and 2016
networks.
Historical Events
We utilize and update the event dataset created for [13], which included news, aca-
demic articles, Wikipedia entries, etc. from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2012, and from which
we collected 13x12x50=7,800 data points for the 2013 risk network. For the 2014 to
the 2017 risk networks, we relabel prior events and collect new events dated from Jan.
2013 to Dec. 2016. Thus the total number of data points is now 17x12x62=12,648,
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for 62 risks in Table 1. Each data point indicates if a risk is active or passive in a cer-
tain month. By maximizing the log-likelihood defined by Eq. 3 for the observed state
transitions [23,22], we obtain the most likely values of model parameters α,β ,γ for
each year.
Fig. 3 shows the timeline of historical events. Among economic risks, activation
of some events is recorded directly based on the corresponding Wikipedia articles,
such as “European debt crisis”, “Subprime mortgage crisis” and “Air travel disrup-
tion after the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull eruption”. Activation of other events is identified
through human processing of the online statistical data. “U.S. high unemployment
rate” is recorded when the United States (U.S.) unemployment rate is above 7.5%,
“EU high unemployment rate” is recognized when the European Union (EU) unem-
ployment rate is above 9.5%. The “Oil price shock” is recognized when the yearly
change of oil price per barrel exceeds $40 which happened during 2008 and 2009,
and during 2011 and 2012. “U.S. housing bubble burst” is recorded when the average
new house purchase price in the U.S., reaches above $280,000. “EU deflation” is rec-
ognized when the inflation rate is below 0% in the EU, “Global inflation” is recorded
when major economic regions such as the U.S. and the EU have the inflation rate
above 2%. “U.S. severe income disparity” is recognized when U.S. top 1% of U.S.
richest people own more than 20% of total incomes. Most of the economic risk events
activated at around 2008 but then became passive after 2014. There is also a chain re-
action among them, “U.S. housing bubble” caused “Subprime mortgage crisis”, then
led to “U.S. and EU high unemployment rate” and “European debt crisis”.
Among environmental risks, “Hurricane seasons” is identified according to the
yearly Atlantic and Pacific hurricane seasons, which happen regularly every year,
starting from May and ending in December. Risk 12 “Failure of climate-change mit-
igation and adaptation” is recognized when there are tremendous damages caused
by climate change such as hurricanes Allison, Dean, and Alex. We consider damage
as tremendous when the cost is above $1 billion. Risk 13 “loss of biodiversity” is
recognized when common bird index drops below 100. Risk 14 “Major natural catas-
trophes” are identified by deadliest earthquakes, avalanches, wildfires, heat waves,
solar storms, etc. Those events also happen naturally, but last shorter than extreme
weather events. “Deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest” is recorded when yearly
deforestation rate is above 15,000 km2 which happened from 2000 to 2005. “Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil spill” happened in 2010, “Beijing air pollution soars to hazard level”
was observed in 2012. Unlike economic risk events, those events usually last up to a
year. “Rising greenhouse gas emissions” is recorded when Annual Greenhouse Gas
Index (AGGI) exceeds 1.2.
Among geopolitical risks, Risk 17 “State collapse or crisis” is recognized by all
coups d’e´tat and coup attempts. Most of them ends within a month. Among few
events related to Risk 18 “Weapons of mass destruction”, we list “Destruction of
Syria’s chemical weapons” in 2013 and several “North Korean nuclear test” started
in 2006. Risk 19 “Interstate conflict” activation list includes major global conflicts
from 2000: “War on Terror”, “Second Congo War”, “Syrian Civil War”, “Iraqi Civil
War”, and “Cold War II”. The “War on Terror” was triggered by “911 attack” in 2001
and includes the wars in Afghanistan, Iraqi, Syria, etc. We consider it ended in 2007
when British government abandoned the use of the term. But the conflicts between
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Fig. 3 The historical risk events from 2000 to 2017. We searched thousands of events online over 18 years
and selected hundreds from them as risk-related events. We label the events based on the description of
risks in each year WEF Global Risk Report. The events are also grouped into five categories.
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nations and terrorists continue to happen. The “Second Congo War” from 1998 to
2003 involved nine nations and often is referred to as “Africa’s World War”. The
“Syrian Civil War” from 2011 and the “Iraqi Civil War” from 2014 are sometimes
described as “proto-world war”. “Cold War II” refers to the political tension between
two opposing geopolitical sides, with one led by Russia and China, and the other
led by the United States and NATO. It starts at the same time with the “Ukraine
crisis” event activation in 2013. The events related to Risk 20 “Large-scale terrorist
attack” are selected from the worldwideworst terrorist strikes each of which caused at
least 300 injuries, 100 fatalities or 20 fatalities among children. Illicit financial flows
from developing countries are above $1 trillion per year from 2011. We consider
activation of Risk 22b “Pervasive entrenched corruption” occurs when there is at
least one country in the world with the Corruption Perceptions Index below 10%
(small index represents high corruption). The scope of Risk 23 “Failure of global
governance” is close to Risk 19 “Interstate conflict”, since it includes the inability to
resolve issues of terrorism, wars, political and economic tensions between countries.
The geopolitical risks are closely related and share similar activity scope: 2001-2006
and 2012-2016. We can see correlation between events related to those risks. These
events started with “911” followed by the increase of the number and damages of
terrorist attacks.
Among the societal risks, there were two major world food price crises during
2007-2008 and 2010-2014, flagged by the rise of the FAO deflated food price index
above 150. The peak of the number of “water conflicts” was reached during 2012-
2014 (above 15 conflicts per year) in the Middle East, which is most likely caused
by the geopolitical risks. Risk 29a “Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases”
includes infectious diseases that cause more than thousands death and had worldwide
impact, such as “SARS”, “H1N1” and “Ebola”. The new disease occurs every several
years and it also last takes several years before it stops spreading. Risk 30 “Large-
scale involuntary migration” includes migration crises in the U.S. and the EU. In
“U.S. migration crisis”, tens of thousands of women and children from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras migrated to the United States in 2014. In “EU migration
crisis”, more than 50,000 refugees were arriving in EU each month in 2015. The
refugees mainly come from Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Afghanistan. Risk
31 “Profound political and social instability” includes major global protests. Risk
34 “Mismanagement of population ageing” mostly activates in developing countries
such as China and India. Risk 35 “Rising religious fanaticism” mostly materializes
in the Middle East.
Among technological risks, Risk 37 “Breakdown of critical information infras-
tructure and networks” materializes every several years. But each time it lasts a
short period. The source of the risk could be natural or human-made incidents, such
as “Submarine cable disruption”, government control or social instability, such as
“Egypt blackout” during the Egyptian revolution, or cyberattacks, such as “Dyn cy-
berattack”. Risk 38 “Large-scale cyberattacks” includes “Indiscriminate attacks”,
“Destructive attacks”, “Cyberwarfare”, “Government espionage”, “Corporate espi-
onage”, “Stolen e-mail addresses and login credentials”, “Stolen credit card and fi-
nancial data”, and “Stolen medical-related data”. Some of the cyberattacks are caused
by geopolitical risks, such as “Cyberattacks during the Russo-Georgian War”. Some
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are related to social instabilities. Some are possibly caused by economic risks, such
as “2014 JPMorgan Chase data breach”. It is also part of Risk 39 “Massive inci-
dent of data fraud/theft”, which includes major incidents of data breaches. One of the
most significant data theft events is ”Global surveillance disclosure” in 2013. Cyber-
attack and Data theft become significant during 2013 and 2014. Most of the other
technological risks are unforeseen consequences of technological advances and may
materialize in the future.
For a particular month, there are four different reasons to label a risk as being
active. One is monthly statistical data, such as ”unemployment rate”, ”oil price”,
”housing price”, ”deflation rate”, and ”food price index”. They are recorded month
by month, which can be directly used to label a risk. Another reason is yearly statisti-
cal data, such as ”yearly deforestation rate”, ”annual greenhouse gas index”, ”corrup-
tion perceptions index”, and ”number of water conflicts per year”. They are recorded
year by year. Thus, we use one years single data point to estimate a risk status for
twelve months. The third one is the record of daily events, such as ”air travel disrup-
tion”, ”oil spill”, ”nuclear test”, ”terrorist attack”, ”blackout”, and ”cyber attacks”.
Within a certain month, if at least predefined number of events occurs, we consider
the corresponding risk as active for the whole month. The last reason is the record of
continuous events, such as ”European debt crisis”, ”subprime mortgage crisis”, ”hur-
ricane seasons”, ”civil war”, ”spread of disease”, ”migration”, and ”data breaches”.
Since those events usually last several months, we consider corresponding risks as
active from the beginning to the end of the event.
Of the five categories, economic and geopolitical risks have strong intra-dependence,
environmental risks happens quite regularly and are relatively independent from each
other, while societal and technological risks are affected by and have strong inter-
dependence with geopolitical and economic risks.
Mean-field Steady State Points
Simulation
With the fitted parameters α,β ,γ , and the activation and recovery probabilities, we
can perform Monte Carlo simulations of the cascades of global risks. Fig. 4 shows
the frequency of a risk being active at each time step t during the simulation of the
2017 risk network with all risks initially inactive. With different initial states, the risk
trajectories differ but eventually reach the same steady state. The frequency of risk i
being active at time t is the ratio of the number of simulation months during which
risk i is active to the total number of simulation months t. The frequency distributions
of risks being active mainly change from 10 to 1000 steps, and generally saturate
afterward. In the steady state, the frequencies of risks being active varies a lot even
for risks in the same category. By denoting the probability of risk i being active at
time t as pi(t), we define such frequencies to be stable when pi(t) ≈ pi(t + 1). By
plugging in the state transition probabilities from Eq. 2, we have
[1− pi(t)]Pi(t)
0→1+ pi(t)[1−Pi(t)
1→0] = pi(t + 1) = pi(t). (5)
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Fig. 4 Asymptotic mean-field steady state frequencies of selected risks being active are shown for the
2017 risk network. Each frequency value is averaged over 1000 runs. For time denoted on the x-axis as
”inf”, the frequencies are calculated by Eq. 6. The environmental group of risks is most frequently active
in this year, but the general level of risk activities is quite low.
Thus,
pˆi =
P0→1i
P0→1i +P
1→0
i
=
1− (1−Li)
α+β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
1− (1−Li)
α+β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j +(1−Li)γ
, (6)
where pˆi is the steady state probability of risk i being active, computed with a suc-
cessive approximation method. The results are plotted in Fig. 5.
Risk Evolution
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the global risks networks and their mean-field steady
state points. To see the changes in risks, we display related risks and their indices
in the five networks side by side. In Table 1 from 2013 to 2017 five risk categories
remain the same, while around 20 risks vanish or merge into other risks. Risk 05b
”Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices” is changed to Risk 05a ”Severe
energy price shock” after 2014. The extreme volatility in agriculture prices is merged
into Risk 27 ”Food crises”. Risk 07c ”Unmanageable inflation or deflation” splits into
risk 07a ”Deflation in a major economy” and 07b ”Unmanageable inflation”. Risk 08
”Severe income disparity”, 09 ”Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation”,
and 10 ”Hard landing of an emerging economy” are not discussed since/after 2014,
because of the recovery of the global economy. Risk 14b ”Unprecedented geophysi-
cal destruction” and 14c ”Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms” are merged into 14a
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2013
Fig. 5 The mean-field steady state probabilities of risks being active for each network from 2013 to 2017.
To see the changes in risks, we display related risks and their indices in the five networks side by side. In
Table 1 from 2013 to 2017 five risk categories remain the same, while around 20 risks vanish or merge
into other risks. Visual inspection reveals that in 2013 the dominant risk was economical. It continued its
dominance to 2014 but in that year the environmental group became also more active than the other groups.
In year 2015 and in the following years, the economic risks drop their activity level, while environmental
risk maintain significant level of activity in this period. In years 2016 social risks increase their activity
levels, but weakened them in the following year.
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Fig. 6 The mean-field steady state probabilities of economic risks being active for each of the networks
from 2013 to 2017. Fiscal crisis significantly decreases from 2014, unemployment risk peaks in 2014,
energy price shock peaks in 2013, while other risks vary minimally over the five years.
”Major natural catastrophes”. Risk 15b ”Irremediable pollution”, 15c ”Land and wa-
terway use mismanagement” and 15d ”Rising greenhouse gas emissions” are merged
into 15a ”Man-made environmental catastrophes”. Risk 16 ”Antibiotic-resistant bac-
teria” is not discussed after 2014. Risk 21a ”Illicit trade” is changed from geopolitical
to economic and not described in 2015. Risk 26 ”Failure of urban planning” changes
from an environmental to a geopolitical. Risk 30 ”Large-scale involuntarymigration”
is not described in 2014. Risk 31 ”Profound social instability” is newly proposed in
2014 while risks 32-36 are removed because of their low likelihoods and impacts.
Finally, risks 40b-42 are excluded because most of them describe unforeseen conse-
quences of advanced technologies and have not yet occurred.
Comparing the mean-field steady state probabilities of risks from 2013 to 2017
in Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, we find that the probabilities of economic risks widely de-
creased, reflecting a gradual global recovery from the 2008 economic crisis. Only
”State collapse”, ”Large-scale terrorist attacks”, ”Illicit trade” and ”Large-scale in-
voluntary migration” significantly increased in the category of geopolitical and soci-
etal risks, respectively. This reveals the downside of ”Failure of global governance”.
Considering environmental risks, we find that man-made risks decreased, while only
natural risks ”Extreme weather events” and ”Major natural disasters” increased. The
ability of the public to prevent environmental degradation improved. In the techno-
logical risks category, ”Massive incident of data fraud/theft” increases due to the
boom of private data in the Internet era. The global risks transfer from economic to
geopolitical and societal, as technological risks become heightened.
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Fig. 7 The mean-field steady state probabilities of environmental risks being active for each of the net-
works from 2013 to 2017. Man-made problems (”Failure of climate adaptation”, ”Ecosystem collapse”)
gradually decrease from 2013 to 2017, while natural disasters (”Extreme weather”, ”Natural catastrophes”)
gradually increase from 2013 to 2017.
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Fig. 8 The mean-field steady state probabilities of geopolitical risks being active for each of the networks
from 2013 to 2017. ”State collapse” and ”Failure of national governance” have very similar behavior,
since both of them describe risks inside nations and reflect the instability of their governments. Together
with interstate conflicts, those risks significantly increase in 2015, and gradually decrease afterward. They
may be caused by ISIS and the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Terrorist attacks happen more frequently in 2017,
while growing illicit trade elevated levels of risk starting in 2016. This may be an affect of high risks
of ”State collapse”, ”Interstate conflict” and ”National governance failure” during 2015. Risks associated
with weapons of mass destruction remain low over the 5 year span.
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Fig. 9 The mean-field steady state probabilities of societal risks being active for each network from 2013
to 2017. ”Failure of urban planning” greatly decreases after 2014. Food and water crises gradually decrease
with the global effort to address them. ”Large-scale involuntary migration” drastically increases in 2016,
due to the 2015 European Union migration crisis. It is largely affected by high risk of ”State collapse”,
”Interstate conflict” and ”National governance failure” in 2015. ”Profound political and social instability”
gradually increases from 2014 to 2016 as a consequence of rising ”Interstate conflict”, while ”Rapid and
massive spread of infectious diseases” maintains a steady and low risk level.
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Fig. 10 The mean-field steady state probabilities of technological risks being active for each network from
2013 to 2017. The peak of ”Large-scale cyberattacks” and ”Massive incident of data fraud/theft” in 2014
might be triggered by ”Global surveillance disclosures” in the latter half of 2013. ”Breakdown of critical
information infrastructure and networks” and ”Adverse consequences of technological advances” pose
very little risk. Moreover, with fast-paced advancements in technology, all risks in this category gradually
rise.
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Fig. 11 The mean-field steady state probabilities of risk activity in all categories for each of the networks
from 2013 to 2017. In agreement with the results presented earlier, the economic risks drastically decrease
from 2014 and maintain a low level afterward. Environmental risks occur regularly, with the exception
of ”Extreme weather” during 2014. The geopolitical risks have a small increase in 2015, during which
interstate conflicts increase. The average values of societal risks experience a steady rise, but the maximum
values have a high variance. That is because the Risk 08 ”Severe income disparity” is put into societal risks
in 2014, and because ”Large-scale involuntary migration” drastically increases in 2016. Technological
risks gradually increase with an anomalous spike encountered during 2014.
Analytic Probabilities and Empirical Observations
Fig. 5 shows the analytic probabilities of risk being active at steady state over years.
Fig. 3 depicts the time periods at which specific risk activities were observed and
recorded. The analytic probabilities are smoother than the observations because they
provide a real numbers instead of a binary signal. Empirical observations contain
more detailed information than analytic probabilities. Although there are some dif-
ferences, their main results are very consistent. Both results show the economic risks
becoming inactive after year 2014. The environmental risks happen regularly every
year. The geopolitical risks are highly interconnected. The risks “State collapse”,
“Interstate conflict” and “Failure of national governance” have similar activity time
scope. “Terrorist attacks” and “Illicit trade” are becoming important recently. The
risk “Migration” had active start from year 2016. The activity of technological risks
gradually increases over years.
Model Validations
Parameter Recovery Precision
To test the accuracy of parameter recovery process for each year, we first take the
learned α,β ,γ as ground truth parameters, then use them to generate 125 test datasets
with the same time steps of the historical data. From 125 test dataset, we learned
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Table 2 Relative error bounds of activation and recovery parameters of global risks from the year 2013
to 2017. Clearly activation bounds are higher, up to 2.5 times higher than corresponding recovery bounds.
The former peak at 20% in 2016, while the latter peak at 12% in 2015.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
activation bound 0.181 0.125 0.174 0.200 0.188
recovery bound 0.087 0.104 0.119 0.077 0.071
125 sets of new parameters that we use as sets of as test parameters. We consider
activation parameter as aα + bβ , where a,b is the average fraction of internal and
external activation in a dataset. The recovery parameter equals to γ . From 125 sets
test parameters, we first filter out 33.3% outliers with the largest KS distance, defined
by Eq. 7, to the ground truth parameters, then determine the relative activation bound
and recovery bound in the rest 66.6% of the sets. We call those sets validation dataset
and we refer to the corresponding parameters as validation parameters.
KS(v1,v2) =max
i
(|v1[i]/v2[i]− 1|) (7)
In this experiment, v1 of Eq. 7 is a vector of validation parameters, while v2 is a vector
of ground truth parameters. Each vector contains two variables, activation parameter
and recovery parameter. Table 2 shows the bounds of activation and recovery param-
eters for each year network. In 2013, recovery bound 0.087 represents that within
the validation parameters, the largest absolute relative error of recovery parameter to
the ground truth recovery parameter is 0.087. For all risk networks, the relative error
bound of activation parameter is less than 20%, the relative error bound of recovery
parameter is around 10%.
Furthermore, we use the set of ground truth parameters and each set of validation
parameters to generate another 12 months of data after the end of ground truth his-
torical data. In this test, we run 100 realizations and calculate the average frequency
of risk being active and risk activation for each set of parameters and the results are
plotted in Fig. 12. The average frequencies of risk being active are the sum of number
of risks being active in each month averaged over R risks and 12 months. The average
frequencies of risk activation are the number of times of any of the risks was activated
over the entire simulation averaged over R risks. In both tests of all risk networks, the
average results of ground truth and validation data are very close. The absolute rela-
tive error of results in the worst simulation in validation data to the average results in
ground truth data is around 20%.
Network Effects
We compare the simulation results by CARP model with and without network ef-
fect in Fig. 13. This test is based on 2013 network and dataset from [13]. The net-
work model is the simulation of the 2013 network in Fig. 1, while the independent
model ignores network effects by disregarding all edges. In general, compared with
the independent model, the accuracy of the network model is significantly higher as
evidenced by having the mean simulated activity closer to historical data than in-
dependent model does and by requiring 47% smaller multiple of standard deviation
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Fig. 12 Error bounds of average frequencies of risk being active and of risk activation from the year 2013
to 2017. Average real represents the average results in the test of ground truth dataset. Average simulation
represents the average results in the test of validation dataset. Worst simulation represents the maximum
or minimum results in the test of validation dataset.
bound to cover all historical data than the independent model needs. Some other net-
work effect analyses were presented in [21]. The results show that the isolated risks
(nodes with low degrees) have extremely low external activation fractions and thus
are unlikely to be influenced by other risks in the network.
Sensitivity Tests
In this subsection, we consider another two important factors: likelihood and histor-
ical data. Fig. 14 shows the sensitivity test by changing the likelihood or historical
data of single or all risks. The probability of a risk being active at steady state is sen-
sitive to both likelihood and historical data. In the likelihood test, a risk is sensitive to
the change of its single likelihood but tolerant to the change of all risks likelihoods.
In the historical data test, on the contrary, a risk is tolerant to the change of its single
historical activity but sensitive to the change of all risks historical activity.
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Fig. 13 The average number of risk activations at each time step, measured over 100 runs, plotted as a
function of time for the models with (red line) and without network effects (blue line). For comparison,
the black curve represents the number of times risk activation was observed in the historical data. The
purple and orange curves demonstrate what multiple of standard deviation is needed to get curves above
and below the mean so the cover all points of historical data, for network model and independent model,
respectively. This multiple is significantly lower, 1.82, for network model than for independent model
(2.67). Thus, the extreme historical data point among 156 such points has probability of 3.4% to appear
in network model, which is highly likely, but only 0.38% for the independent model, which in contrast is
unlikely to appear with this number of historical data, demonstrating poor match between historical data
and the independent model.
External Activation
Transition Fractions
With the steady state probability of a risk being active, we can compute the probabil-
ity of three different transition processes:
– internal activation: Ainti = (1− pˆi)p
int
i is the probability of inactive risk i (1− pˆi)
being triggered internally pinti .
– external activation: Aexti = (1− pˆi)[1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j ] is the probability of in-
active risk i (1− pˆi) being triggered externally 1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j .
– internal recovery: Areci = pˆi p
rec
i is the probability of active risk i (pˆi) recovering
preci .
For simplicity, we ignore the probability of a risk being activated both internally and
externally with probability (1− pˆi)p
int
i [1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j ] (the value is negligible).
Thus, the three transition processes can be treated as independent variables. With
the probabilities of transition processes, we can get the fraction of one transition
process to all possible transitions for each risk by setting ainti =
Ainti
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
, aexti =
Aexti
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
, areci =
Areci
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
.
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Fig. 14 The comparison of the probability of risks being active at steady state by changing risk likelihood
and historical data. The horizontal axis is the list of all risks grouped by different year and sorted by
their probability. The baseline is the probability of risks without any change. The four other tests include
reducing only: 1. the normalized likelihood of the single target risk by 10%; 2. the frequency of the single
target risk being active in the historical data by 10%; 3. the normalized likelihoods of all risks by 10%; 4.
the frequencies of all risks being active in the historical data by 10%.
Risk Influence
In this section, we calculate the influence exerted by one risk on others. In the exper-
iments, we first disable a risk i by setting its normalized likelihood Li = 0, and then
calculate the new external activation frequency of risk j as aextj−i ( j 6= i). We obtain
Ii→ j = a
ext
j − a
ext
j−i, (8)
where Ii→ j is an indicator of the influence that risk i exerts on risk j, quantifying the
external activation effects of risk i onto risk j.
Fig. 15 shows the influence of a category of risks on other categories, which dis-
cerns between cause and correlation of risks. From 2013 to 2017, the most significant
changes in risk influence categories are observed for economic and technological
risks. The economic risks used to be the most influential risks and had the highest
impact on other risks. However, as of 2017 their influence decreased. Instead, the in-
fluence of geopolitical and societal risks increased. In 2013, technological risks were
the least vulnerable risks and had very limited influence on others. Although they are
still the least influential risks in 2017, we can see an increasing trend in their influ-
ence. As shown in Fig. 1 and 2, the 2014 and 2016 risk networks are sparser than
the others. In a sparse risk network, risks have a higher tendency to connect with
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Fig. 15 Influence among risk categories, normalized using a logarithmic scale. With the unity-based nor-
malization of the influences, we find that most categories have large self-influence (diagonal elements).
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ones in the same category. Thus, the risk categories in 2014 and 2016 have largest
self-influence in Fig. 15.
Conclusions
Here, we use the CARP model to simulate cascades in the global risk networks. With
the most likely model parameters obtained through MLE (maximum likelihood esti-
mation) and applied to a real event dataset, we compute the mean-field steady state
probabilities of risks being active for each year from 2013 to 2017. The results ob-
tained for the annual risk networks from 2013 to 2017 show significant changes in
the asymptotic mean-field probabilities of risk activation. Applying the approach to
finding bounds on recovery in CARP model presented in [14] to the global risk net-
work, we measure the error of model parameter recovery and find that it is bounded
by±20% of the values obtained with historical data for years from 2013 to 2017. The
corresponding error of the risk activity is smaller but of similar magnitude. Since the
range of values for critical risks reported above was much larger, we can conclude
that we have enough historical data to support the conclusions of our paper. Finally,
by computing the difference of external activation frequencies of risk j with enabled
and disabled risk i, we define the influence Ii→ j that risk i exerts on risk j. The results
for the annual risk networks from 2013 to 2017 demonstrate that the influence among
risks changes significantly over the years.
With the CARP model, we first compare yearly risks and then measure the quan-
titative changes of risks that provide an interesting view on evolution of the global
economy and its risks. The activation probabilities and influences of economic risks
are dramatically reduced as a result of economic recovery since 2014. The increase
in activation probability of state collapse, terrorist attacks, illicit trade and migration
show the negative effects of the failure of global governance, especially inaction of
certain international bodies, like the Security Council of the United Nations. Tech-
nological risks are becoming more influential as well due to the increase of private
data leaks. In each year from 2013 to 2017, the significance of economic threats de-
creases, while geopolitical and societal risks become more detrimental. All those an-
alytic results are consistent with empirical observations. The quantitative analysis of
our method creates a basis for developing tools for predictions of future risk network
evolution and for guidance how to reduce damages caused by future risk cascades.
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